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Commander,  Liberman,  and Yemtsov  analyze  and income,  but the changes  remain restricted
changes  in the Russian  labor  market in 1992.  and the sources  of these  restrictions  imply
They focus  on t-he  path of wages and employ-  significant  economic  costs. The underpinning  of
ment in a context  of partial  price liberalization  the  current stagflation  is the inability  to break  the
and considerable  ambiguity  about  government  soft  budget  constraint  on state firms and to
and central  bank policy.  impose  realistically  a systematic,  transparent  set
of constraints  on the firms' financing  demands.
Under  the former  Soviet  economy,  the f  irm  This has combined  with the firms' continuing
was the bedrock  of the centrally  planned  system.  ability  to exercise  market power  alongside  weak
The relaxation  of centralized  controls  did not  controls  on wage claims.
result  in substantial  employment  losses  partly
because  of the implicit  "moral economy"  of the  Employment  transitions  have been  domi-
system  and partly because  of continuing  con-  nated by high levels of quits at the base of the
straints  on wages.  skill  structure.  Involuntary  separations  have been
limited,  involving  mostly  women and white
In 1992,  the wage structure  and employment  collar workers.  Firms commonly  provide  de
levels in the economy's state sector  exhibited  factor  unemployment  compensation  to workers
surprising  stability,  reflecting  the system's  in the form  of minimum  wage  payments  with
immense  inertia.  Despite  announced  regime  little  or no work  requirement.  T-here  is evidence
changes,  at the end of 1992  the number  of  of some increase  in the proportion  of laid-off
jobseekers  was  no more than 1.5 percent  of the  workers  among  the unemployed,  but firms seem
labor force.  to prefer  hoarding  labor  in light of uncertainty
about  policy, firm,  or product-specific  market
But significant  changes  have been  made:  prospects.
wage and employment  decisions  havc been
widely  liberalized;  some restraints  on labor  Wages  have been  more volatile.  Wages
mobility  have been  removed;  changes  have aLo  initially  bore almost  all of the adjustment  costs,
been made in ownership  title; and there has been  but have shown  mild rccovery  thereafter.  Lax
some expansion  in the private  sector,  as yet  monetary  policy  and decentralized  insider  power,
largely concentrated  in services.  giving  risc to relative  employment  stability  and
al  wage rigidity,  are powerful  ingredients  for
These substantive  changes  are i,2iortant for  hyperinflation.
future expectations  about  entitlements  to jobs
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Introduction
In this paper we provide an analysis of recent changes in the Russian labour market.  Our
emphasis is on the path of wages and employment  in a context of partial price liberalization,  high and
rising inflation  and conlsiderable  arnbiguity  with respect to the nature of government  and central bank
policy.  Aside fr'rn  attempting  to map using official data the path of basic variables over the recent
period, we  also attempt to  develop a  set of simple analytical models that capture the wage and
employment  aecisions  made by firms.  For, given the manner in which the former  Soviet economy  was
organized, the firm in effect was the bedrock of the planned system.  While subordinated  to a central
authority, normally  a ministry,  the clear potential  for firms to arrogate  decisions  motivated  the relatively
tight retention  of centralized  controls. And indeed  when  those controls  were relaxed, the decentralization
that was validated  predictably  yielded stronger nominal wage claims and considerable  labour turnover.
Nevertheless,  it did not result in very substantial  employment  losses. This can be attributed  not  only to
the implicit 'moral economy' of the etatiste era but also to the fact that constraints  on wages and their
intra-firm allocation were retained. The result, as we show, was that by 1991  the wa-f. structure and
employment  levels in the state sector of the economy  continued  to exhibit surprising  stau !ity. In fact,
this stability spills over into 1992,  pointing to the inmmense  inertia in the system.
The paper is organized  in the following  way.  Sectio-is  1 and 2 provide discussion  of the initial
conditions  and the background  against which the 1992  changes  ne,!d  be set.  The emphasis  is on wages
and employment  and the starting point the new Enterprise Law that was enacted in January 1988.  In
Appendix 1, we also provide  a simple  bargaining  model  which seeks  to capture the main intended  features
of wage and effort setting in firms still regulated by a central agency but motivated  through incentive
payments. The same sections  then concentrate  on developments  in 1991  and 1992  drawing not only on
time series but recent firm and establishment  level information. Aside from using official  data provided
by the Russian  Goskomstat,  we complement  these discussions  by extensively  drawing  on a new dataset -
- a survey of 41 firms in the Moscow  and Volga regions  - that we organized. The sample covered  firms
in  0 branches, including  trade and services. The firms were randomly  selected  and all interviews  were
held over a period of two weeks in mid-November  1992. While the sample size is clearly small and by
no means representative, we feel that it provides a useful check on more aggregated  data, while also
providing  a range of information  that cannot be picked up elsewhere.
It is shown in the paper that despite significant  negative shocks  to output, there has been littleWage and Emplovment  Decisions  2
significant change in employment. Consequently, labour productivity has generally fallen.  Sector,
branch and regional data appeai to confirm the apparent sluggishness  of the adjustment in terms of
quantities. With respect to wages, changes  in effective  purchasing  power, given  shortages, are difficult
to identify  so that changes  to the statistical  real wage need  be treated  with considerable  caution. Further,
institutional rigidities resulting in cash shortages and other banking system constraints continued to
enforce a wedge  between  notional  and actual  purchasing  claims in the first half  of 1992. Thus, the strong
impression that is gained is of significant  wage flexibility  over 1992  with relatively  little adjustment  to
employment.  At the same time, we observe large and fairly synchronised  downward  movements  to
output. Appendix 2 sketches  a model in which incumbent  workers in a de facto worker controlled  firm
are primarily  concerned  with employment  stability,  one result  of which is that wages  prove more flexible.
Section 3 provides a detailed  discussion  of unemployment  on both a Russian  and regional  levels.
It  is shown that unemnployment  has yet to  attain significant levels and has been rather uniformly
distributed  across regions. Among  those who  are unemployed,  women, younger  labour  force  participants
and white collar workers dorminate.  Indeed, over three quarters of the unemployed  in mnid-1992  v  -
w-omen. Sections  4 and 5 relate the changes  in wages  and employment  to the wider chianges  in economic
policy and particularly to the monetary  stance  of the Central Bank over 1992. The nature or thc shocks
to output and employment  are discussed  and the apparent dominance  of aggregate  shocks  emphasized.
Section  6 complements  the discussion  by focussing  on the role of benefits  - cash and non-cash  -
-provided  by firms to labour. It is shown  that such benefits  comprise  up to 25  % of labour income  using
the information  collected from our survey and hence necessarily  constitute  a key area in the reform of
wage payments and firm expenditures. Section  7 concludes.
A final caveat is in order at this stage. The discussion  throughout  centres  on the state se^tor and
ignores recent and increasingly  significant  changes  in control and ownership. Already,  there is evidence
of widespread  small-scale  privatisation  in the retail  sector, particularly  in Moscow,  alongside  spontaneous
privatization  in state firms. Indeed,  one recent  paper incautiously  suggests  that private sector  employment
in Russia may now approach 20% of total employment  2.  But for obvious  reasons, information  on the
private sector is difficult to secure and we choose for the time being to limit our attention to the state
sector.  Furthermore, it is as yet unclear that the title changes  occurring among  state firms corresponds
to any meaningful  change in behaviour.
2 Aslund  (1992)Fig  1
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1: Wage Setting
1.1: The System of Payments
It is well appreciated  that wages  in the  Soviet  system were originally  intended  to square a circle;
to fulfil basic efficiency  criteria -- in other words, motivate  workers -- while constraining  distributional
effects likely to be associated  with an efficiency  based scheme  of payments. The result was a centralized
or tariff system which tolerated some limited  wage dispersion  by skill, seniority  and other attributes. In
addition, a set of mechanical  regional coefflcients  were applied to all ranges of the tariff wage structure
to reflect differences in the price level and working conditions  as well as to channel labour to priority
sectors 3.  However, there was an increasing  use of bonuses  to motivate  workers with the distribution
of bonuses determiined  within the firm. Piece rates and bonus schemes  were widespread. The overall
size of the bonus fund was ultLnately  determined  by the central  agencies. Thus, while the Soviet  wage
system remained heavily regulated  from the centre it had increasingly  absorbed  payments  practices tha'
expiicitly  linked pay to individual  or fim. level performance.
By the mid-1980s bonuses comprised  over 16.5% of the average industrial wage rising to just
under 21 % in industry.  A broader definition  encompassing  some measure of surplu  sharing indicates
indicates  that in industry  over 80% of establishments  operated  profit-sharing  schemes  with those schemes
contributing  between 10/12% of average earnings in 1991  '.  Tke performance  of work collectives  was
the dominant base for bonus calculations  with a further 15/20% of cases relating bonus  payments  more
mechanically  to the firn's  gross revenues.  Of further note has been the growing use of additional
monetary payments  supplementing  tariff based wages; roughly  75 % of firms paid such supplements  and
these comprised  on average over 40% of total earnings.
The structure of relative wages  that resulted  had a number  of striking traits. airst, one notes the
relatively low returns to skills or grade. A 1991  est'blishment  level survey of 500 firms in the Moscow
and St.Petersburg regions indicates,  for example,  that managerial  wages as a multiple  of unskilled  wages
were rarely more than 2.5 5.  The World  Bank survey carried out over 41 firms in the Moscow region
points to a similar differential in the third quarter of 1991.  Management  wages were barely 35% on
average higher than for professional  staff and/or skilled workers. In general, wages of supervisory  and
3 A full description  of the system  is provided  in Oxenstiema  (1990). See  also Adam  (1980).
4Standing  (1992a)
See Standing  (1992a)Table 1:  Retail Prices, Wages and Reglonal Variation:  Summary Statistics, 1992
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specialist  iianual workers in all sectors were either equal to or higher  than for specialist  employees. This
gap was  adjusted  upwards  when measuring  over average  earnings  (including  bonuses  and other non-wage
monetary  payments). Nevertheless,  the impression  of a compressed  structure  of wage differentials  when
measured  over job functions  is reinforced. This conclusion  holds when further classifying  over type of
control structure.  Thus, while joint-stock --id ccoperative firms had clearly h;  ier wage levels for
comparable  skills, the within-firm  distribution  remained  very similar  to that ror the dominant  state sector.
Disaggregating  bv sector, it is clear that industrial  sector workers  have rem'ained  privileged  with
wages notably higher than in non-productive  branches.  Priority sectors, such as energy and to some
extent the military, had wage levels at the peak of the wage ladder.  Pactoring in bonus payments to a
fuller earnings  measure tended  to exaggerate  this differentiation.  Even  so, available  data show rather low
spreads across branches and it is striking that x ith respect to the average state sector vage the average
branch  variation was no more than plus/minus  25% by 1985  6,
These features suggest the following conclusions; (i) that greater decentralization  of wage
decisions and growth of non-state firms was associated with some departure from the tariff wage
structure, permitting  greater dispersion in wages  across skill and other categories,  (ii) that performance-
linked  payments  shifted average earnings  up and permitted  a further widening  in wage differentials,  (iii)
that these resulted from an explicit  objective  of inducing  greater effort from workers  and, by associating
earnings more closely to firm perfornance, to induce nanagerial behaviour on the part of managers
rather than have them act as simple transmission  belts.  While the degree of difi'erentiation  should not
be exaggerated, there is some evidence to indicate that these shifts reversed in part the earlier (pre-
1985/86)  tendency to lesser relative wage dispersion.
From  the beginning  of 1988  firms were subject  to a new Enterprise  Law that enhanced  the weight
of finn level decisions  with respect to the centre and provided  for worker  participation  in firms decisions
'  Greater discretion was granted to the firm in disposing of bonus payments while maximum wage
ceilings  were abolished. While in principle  the Law allowed  for firms to determine  the employment  levei
and composition,  until very recently  we can consider  employment  to have still been determined  outside
the firm.  Separations  continued to be difficult  to enforce. The Enterprise Law explicitly  linked wages
and bonuses  to financial results with the amounts  available  to the wage and bonus funds being directly
6 Oxenstierma  (1990), ppl44ff
7 This included  thc right  to elect  firm  managers  every  five  years  with  bi-annuai  genera;  meetings  of the work
force.Wage  and Employment  Decisions  _  7
associated to gross revenues ii. the first case and residual income  in the second.  The principal  features
of the ILaw  were that firm workforces  were to)  have an active  say in management,  includin- electing the
head of the firn.  Firns were intended  to be self financing  with payments  to the budget pre6eterriined
and fixed over five ycar periods.  Eirms could also d&termine  the size and structure of employment  as
well  as wages. Initially, there was no maximum  limit  on individual  wages, but this was  amended in 1989
as wage demands  acce .rated. Appendix  I provides  a more detailed  discussion  of the wage rule that was
adopted by the vast majority  of Russian  firms
In addition to cash wages, including  bonuses  and surplus  sharin,,  workers commonly  received
significant  non-monetary  benefits, including  housing. This was primarily  true for industrial firms.  A
fuller discussion  of this issue is reserved  until Section  5 below.
1.2: Wage Path tin  1991 and 1992
We h? 'e the obvious problem in measurement  across scarcity regimes, complicated  in 1992 by
the additional  problem  of cash shortages  anu liquidity  constraints. both drive a wedge between notional
and actual claims making identification  of the real-real wage almost impossible. Further, the presence
of secondary  work - in 1991 this was measured  at 3.5% of total employment  in the state sector -- and
its likely expansion  omits  components  of aggregate  wage income. In addition, increasing  recent evidence
of short time work and unpaid vacations forced on workers by firns would result in reduced de facto
nominal wage payments. An October 1992  Goskomstat  survey  of 22,000 firms found that a quarter had
shifted  to short time working or unpaid vacations  for workers. Approximately,  40% of the compulsory
leave was unremunerated  with partial wage payments  in a further 54%.  These developments  in 1992,
paralleling the sharp downward  shift in capacity  utilization,  obviously  reduce effective wage payments.
Despite these important  ca-eats, the aggregate  data carry infornation both with respect to the direction
of change and the structure of relative wages.
At first glance, official wage data show sectoral statistical real claims accelerating in  1991.
Ignoring money illusion  and goods shortages, we see roughly 20% .ncreases  in average state sector as
well as industrial  wages ov.,  1991, with most of this increase  falling in the second half of the year.  At
the peak in December 1991, statistical real wages were roughly 50% higher than in January 1991  and
double the level of January 1988 when the Law on Enterprise Reform was enacted.  However, cash
constraints  and deteriorating  goods  market supply  make  comparison  problematic  over time. In addition -
For a full discussion  and presentation  of the two possible  rules for determixdng  residual  income,  see
Uxenstiema  (1990).Wagt  &Bd  ErIplo=Ot  QeciAjM8
Table 2:  Regional  Data (January  - July/August 1992:  Januarv  9  = 100)
Region  Nominal  Total  Industrial  Unemploy.  Unemploy.
Wages  Empicy.  Employment  Broad  Narrow  Vacancies
North  355.4  98.8  9  160.8  215.4  86.2
NW  325.7  93.3  95.9  237.8  318.8  43.9
Centre  352.1  96.6  99.1  206.6  330.8  65.1
V-Viatsky  407.8  98.7  99.4  224.5  942.C  60.3
C.Chemozem  464  102.6  99  200.2  573.8  51.1
Povolzhsk  431.9  100.7  °9.3  153.8  5)7.5  58.2
N.Caucasus  325.9  100.9  98.4  186.1  472.9  53.4
Ural  396  97.7  100  155.3  823.3  54.6
W.Siberia  385.6  99  100.9  203.4  802.9  59.8
E.Siberia  302.4  100.4  102.1  163.5  431.7  71.3
Far East  392  97.5  100  174.6  473.4  83.6
Kaliningrad  408.8  96.1  94.7  212.8  213.7  70.8
RUSSIA  373.8  98.5  99.5  186.7  426.4  62.0Wage and Emplovment  Decisions  9
- as Figure... makes clear -- Russian  price series display  considerable  variance,  particularly in 1992.
The climb in statistical  wages is followed  by a precipitous  fall over the first quarter of 1992; a
decline of over 55% over end-1991. The decline  is yet larger -- around 75% -- when measuring  average
industry sector product wages.  There are some signs of slight upward drift again (see Fig. l)  after
January 1992.  This leaves statistical  real wages at around their mid-1991  levels by the same period in
1992.  The second round of the ILO establishment  survey, covering 109 units, in June 1992 reports an
average wage decline of around 30% between  September  1991 and June 1992. This would be broadly
consistent  with stability  over the period mid 1991  to mid 1992.
We can supplement  the discussion  of branch level  wage developments  by looking  in some more
detail at the evolution of regional wages.  This has merits for several reasons.  First, for institutional
reasons the data appears  to be more reliable. Second, for real wage calculations  (putting aside for the
moment problems associated with scarcity regimes)  we need factor in the non-trivial  differences in
regional price levels.  We observe high coefficients  of variation  for the first quarter.  The spread over
maximum  and minirnum  rates of change in retail prices remains  quite significant  throughout. However,
it is evident (see Table 1) that regional  variations  in inflation  have declined  over the course of 1992  and
further drta disaggregated  by state and kolkhoz markets further substantiates the view that regional
inflation  rates have strongly converged  over the course of 1992.  Third, we need note the differences
arising from the system of regional  wage coefficients  applied to base wages.
Nominal wages disaggregated  by region are striking for the high variance across region as
indicated by the coefficient  of variation.  While we observe no trend Ever  1992 we do find a major
increase in variance when compared with  1991.  Deflating by  regional retail prices, we observe
considerable dispersion and instability.  The coefficient of variation indeed increases significantly
throughout 1992.  Differences  in the path of regional  real wages, given convergence  in price changes,
can thus be assumed to be driven by divergent nominal wage claims than by variations in regional
inflations.
The striking divergence  in real wage claims is matched  by the apparently  strong rebound over
1992 that we observe since January.  Using the retail price deflators we report regional real wage
indicators for the first nine months  of 1992 in Table 2.  Basing to January, we observe an average real
wage expansion  of over 80% in a period less characterized  by large divergences  in goods availability.
The expansion  in real claims relates to all regions but is highly  uneven in its temporal  distribution.
Relating  statistical  real wages  to July 1991  (prior to the extreme  scarcities  of the last half of 1991)Wage and EmplovMent  Decisions  10
levels we can see that the initial fall in January and February 1992  is rapidly  recuperated. However, the
picture is somewhat  changed  when using the consumer  price index; wages remain broadly  constant. But
the consumer  price index  is a less appropriate  deflator, particularly  over the  earlier months  of 1992, given
high dispersion in regional price changes.  The broad picture thus appears to be that the real wage
contraction  associated  to the price shock of January 1992  has subsequently  been largely reversed.
This conclusion appears true across most sectors, though of course current statistics do not
adequately capture the movement  of wages in the private sector.  The ILO survey reports real wage
contractions  in the  private sector very slightly  lower than in the state sector  but aggregate  'official' private
sector, cooperatives  and joint ventures  data report a wage fall over early 1991 exceeding  that for state
firms and persisting  through to mid-1992.  But the situation is muddied,  particularly  given the rapid and
ambiguous  translation  of title occuring  over this period.  Sectors  with above average wage expansion  in
1991 maintained that process, while more gradual wage increments  continued to characterise ex ante
lower wage sectors, particularly  in the non-material  branches.
Evidence  from the World Bank  survey provides some interesting  evidence  for the path of wages
over the period 1991.3 - 1992.3.  Table 3 provides the raw information  c;..egorizing  in terms of firm
size.  Several features  are notable. First, the predictably  low dispersion in the wage levels  across firm
size class and the bias in the wage structure  toward skilled  workers. Nominal  changes  across the period
show a generally  high degree of convergence,  though with clearly stronger wage increases reported in
the larger firns and for higher  level staff, in particular. Real statistical  wages  computed  using consumer
prices indicate  a fall of between 35-45% for mort workers, with, however, much lower decline for all
workers in larger establishments.  Indeed,  top management  in the largest  size class slightly  improved  their
statistical real wage, with other categories  registering declines  of around 10/20% (see Table 4).  This is
broadly consistent  with the information  imparted  by official, aggregate  wage series.
1.3: Relative Wages
With respect to  relative wages, there is some upward drift in the standard deviation and
coefficient  of variation  across sectors and some initial evidence  of that continuing in 1992. But Figure
2 shows relatively limited shifts in sectoral wage rankings but dispersion of the levels across branches
increases  in 1992. Industry, transport, construction  and financial  sector wages remain the wage leaders
but the spread around the average wage is not that powerfully  altered, with the exception  of agricultureWage and Emplovment  Decisions  l 
whose relative wage has fallen sharply 9.  Indeed, looking at relative sectoral wages over  1991 and
January - August 1992  we observe  very little change, indicating  the power of institutional  features  in the
wage setting that have tended  to dominate  the distributive  effects  comnmonly  transmitted  through high and
unstable  inflation. This is confirmed  by our firm survey which  indicates  that in over 80% of cases wages
remained administratively  set, rather than bargained.  This points to a continuing  de facto role for the
tariff wage structure.
There is, however, some fragmentary  evidence  that wage differentials  have widened in favour
of groups of organized - largely but not exclusively  blue-collar  - workers and that this process likely
reflected  more the exercise of respective  bargaining  powers :ather than any explicit association  of wage
to output changes '°.  Miners and energy sector workers have initially expanded  their ex ante wage
differentials both with respect to industry in general as also with respect to skilled or professional
workers. It is indicative  of the perversity  of the Russian  wage structure  that while  miners  and university
lecturers' wages were roughly comparable  in 1989  by May 1992  the former  received  average wages  over
six times that of the latter. This gap may have  narrowed  by the third quarter  of 1992  but was still around
a multiple of four ".
Yet, while  it is clear that certain  groups  of organized  labour  have  succeeded  in consolidating  their
role as wage leaders, this process is more muddied  elsewhere. For instance,  evidence  from the World
Bank survey provides limited and somewhat  ambiguous  evidence  of a change in wage relativities  over
a range of branches. While over two-fifths  of samnple  firms reported an increase in wage differentials,
this proportion was exactly matched  by firms reporting no change.  And the remaining 17% reported
decreasing inequality  in wages over 1992. For those who did report an increase  in wage differentials,
most attributed this to market features  rather .nan, say, any explicit  association  to private sector wages
or differential linking to prices.  More uniform was the perception that private sector wages were
consistently  higher across all comparable  skills or grades - this was the view in nearly 75  % of sampled
firms.
Confronting  this perception  with the actuai evolution  of wages over our sample  between  the third
quarters of 1991 and 1992 respectively,  we find rather close convergence  in rates of increase across the
9 But this excludes  the  kolhoz  and  likely  understates  the  wage  path.
10 Commander  and Yemtsov  (1992)
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Table 3:  Wage Levels, 1991.3Q - 1992.3Q:  Moscow  Region
By Firm Size and Type of Employee: Monthly Wages (roubles) 1991 and 1992 Third Quarters
Firm Size (employment)
1  2  3  4  5
91.3  92.3  91.3  92.3  91.3  92.3  91.3  92.3  91.3  92.3
Vice-
Director  826  8192  1175  10583  1209  13581 1186  13766  1058  16896
ITR  803  6773  904  5559  791  7952  796  8001  546  6533
Professional
Skilled  903  8070  808  6927  877  9410  738  8566  681  9151
Workers
Unskilled  539  5897  524  4600  400  3591  275  3354  299  4207
Workers
Firm  Size  Categories: 1=  80-350; 2=  351-700; 3=  701-900; 4=  901-1500; 5=  >  1501
employees
Source:  World Bank Siuvey
Table 4: Real Statistical Wage Index; by Firm Size and Type of Work; (1991.3=100)
Firm Size
1  2  3  4  5
Vice-
Director  64  58  72  75  103
ITR  54  40  65  65  77
Professional
Skilled  58  55  69  75  87
Workers
Unskilled  70  57  58  79  91
Workers
Firm Size Categories: 1=  80-350; 2=  351-700; 3=  701-900;  4=  901-1500; 5=  >1501
employees
Source: World Bank SurveyWage and EmplovrMent  Decisions  14
main grade categories. The only apparent loser in relazive  terms were professional  or ITR staff, such
as engineers (see Table 3); but the shift in relativities  is not that large.  However, it is also clear that
wage changes at the top of the grade structure - for the best paid.  managers -- have been consistently
higher.  The standard deviation across firrr size classes further shows a sharp divergence from other
functional  categories. This points to the fact that the relative wages  of top level staff have improved  most
in the largest fir;s.  In addition, we note a clear widening in wage differentials within functional
categories,  particularly again among top managers. This suggests  that the compression  imposed  by the
previous tariff wage structure is at least beginning  to come apart, even if the process remained  (as of
November 1992)  somewhat  muted.
Further decomposing  relative wage changes within industry provides a more nuanced picture.
The ILO datamet  indicates  that the variance  over firm size and property form increases  significantly  over
September 1991/June 1992 but the ranking remains  unaltered.  Employees  in medium (500-1000)  and
large (> 1000) firms generally have higher average wages and earnings  profiles.  Clear improvements
in relative  wages can be found in energy  and heavy industry. By contrast, the main relative wage loser
is engineering;  the branch accounting  for the bulk of job losses in industry.  The World Bank survey
results report little shift in relative rankings  and surprisingly  low variation  in wage rates classed  by skill
over branches  12,
The correlation between employment  losses and relative wage falls is further confirmed by
analysis  of regional wage movements  and relativities. Thus, while wages in the 'extremities' remain
adjusted  upwards  uniformly by coefficients  of 1.5/2.0, it is notable  that wages  in the North-Western  and
Central Regions -- the areas with the largest net job losses - decline relative to the national average in
early and mid-1992. This is supported by the ILO survey in June 1992  where wages were found to be
systematically lower in  firms with the highest employment  contraction 13.  This may indicate the
emergence  of a weak, emerging association  of wage behaviour  and levels  of unemployment  in regional
labour markets. Given very limited mobility  of labour, local unemployment,  rather than national,  could
be expected  to be the incipiently targetted  variable.
1.4: Wage Controls
Prior to  1992 wage controls were largely jettisoned, both explicitly and implicitly through
12 See Commander,  Lxvrman and Yemtsov  (1992a)  for more discussion  of these issues.
13  See Standing  (1992)Wage and Emplovment  Decisions  1  5
reductions  in the share of firm income  transferreci  to the state budget. Nevertheless,  the departures  from
the earlier structure of wages and their relativities was reasonably contained.  The nominal wage
explosion was concentrated in the second half of 1991.  In 1992 -- perhaps surprisingly -- wages were
not explictly  used as an anchor  in the projected  stabilisation. Even so, wage  controls  were not completely
discarded  as wage payments in excess of four times the minimurn  wage were taxed at the same rate as
profits -- 32%.  For 1993  this has been amended  to 50% alongside  a reduction in taxation  of enterprise
income. Figure 3 provides an estimate of warranted  as against actual  wage payments  for each month in
the period January to August 1992.  The calculation  is however somewhat imprecise as the use of
complex intra-regional wage coefficients is difficult to account for fully.  Nevertheless,  the obvious
conclusion  that can be drawn is that the wage rule has been a weak one and has been unable to contain
wage claims. In all months, except  January, the actual  economy-wide  wage bill has exceeded  the norm-
given wage bill by a significant  margin.  The ratio of the actual to the norm has averaged 1.6 over the
first eight months of 1992.
2: Employment
2.1: The Pre-Reform Context
We start with a feature common to all socialist  regimes; high labour force participation,  in part
a function of legal restraints on non-working. This includes strikingly  high levels of participation  by
women, possibly  around 85  % for women  aged  between 16 and 54 years in 1987. We also note the rather
high participation  of pensioners  in the labour force  - estimated  at c30135  % in the early 1980s  - a factor
encouraged  by the labour legislation  and the facility  by which pension  rights can be maintained  alongside
full or part time work 14.
The occupational  structure  was and remains  rather particular. A heavy  bias toward unskilled  and
skilled manual labour has existed reflecting production technology  and the extensive  growth strategy
adopted in earlier periods.  In industry skilled workers hdve comprised around 65% and unskilled
workers a further 15% of total employment.
Several  other factors stand out.  First, the high degree of concentration  and attentuated  extent of
competition  yielded large firms with high average employment;  second, the emphasis  on heavy  industry
and military production generated a  pattern of  labour allocation significantly at odds with market
industrial economies; third, as  in other dirigiste economies, the services sector was rudimentarily
14 See  Barr (1992)Fig  3
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developed - the trade and communication  branches accounted,  for example, for less than 9% of total
employment  in 1985; fourth, open unemployment  was kept very low (though estimates  pre-1990 vary
widely); frictional  unemployment  was variously  put at between  0.6-2.7% of the Soviet labour force in
the 1980s.
We do however observe reasonably  high turnover rates, particularly at thL base of the skill
structure  S.  This was in part induced by changes to the relative wage structure associated with the
development of priority sectors.  Measures to  reduce turnover, such as provision of firm-financed
housing, contributed  to greater regional imrnobility  of labour and to a rather localized  pattern of labour
turnover.  The consistently  higher postings  of vacancies  with respect to job seekers (pre-1991)  and the
apparent downward  mobility  of skilled workers  point to major problems  of mismatch,  in large measure
related to the educational  and training system and the rules for compulsory  placement  of professionals
16. And it is striking, for instance, that turnover in 1991 remained  at high levels - in the Moscow and
St.Petersburg regions  at over 15  % in industry. Nevertheless,  it is worth emphasizing  the predominantly
localized nature of turnover and labour  mobility, in part resulting  from firm provided  housing, in part
from institutional-cum-legal  constraints,  including  propiska, enforced  by local authorities.
2.2: Changes  in Employment  in 1991 and 1992
It  is important to  understand that since  1985/87 we can observe downward employment
adjusaments  in the major sectors that preceded  any attempts  at system-wide  reform. Figure 4 shows that
Li industry, in particular, aggregate  employment  in 1991  was down  nearly 8% over the peak in 1986  and
this trend holds for the major branches, save construction. This is generally related  to the enterprise
reform law (mentioned  above) and the wage setting regime allowed under that reform.  In so far as
greater decentralization  of wage bargaining  combined with an explicit  tax on wages  gave incentives  for
employment  reductions  and enhanced  labour flows conditioned  by relative price effects  this result could
be expected.
Aggregate  data provide some insights into employment  changes over 1991 and 1992 and are
striking for showing  relatively little apparent  employment  loss has been generated  to date, given the size
of shocks to output. This holds for both the state sector as whole and for industry. Total state sector
employment  fell by less than 3.5% between  January 1991 and January 1992 and by a further 1.3%
'' Labour  Turnover  in industry  was  around  14%  between  1988-1991.
16  An extended  discussicm  is provided  in Oxenstierna  (1990),  pp2l5ffWage and Em2lovMent  Decisions  19
between  January and August  1992. In the same period, GDP is estimated  to have fallen  by at least 22  %.
For industry, the decline  is yet smaller;  employment  being  down  less than 3  % in the first reference  period
and falling  a further 0.5 % between  January and June 1992. Part-time  work appears  also to have declined
over the course of 1992;  possibly  by around 5/6% in industry. Across  other sectors, no clear pattern can
be detected.
For industry, there appears  little immediate  evidence  that part time work has substituted  full time
employment,  though current  methods  of classification  would not capture changes  in working  time in this
way.  Formalized  part time work may indeed  have been trimmed  more than for full time employees. Of
more significance  have been  changes  -- particularly  since Juie - in the numbers  of workers  on short time
work and forced  holidays. As already mentioned,  a Goskomstat  firm survey in October 1992 indicated
that as much  as 25 % of all firms have  placed some fraction of their labour force  on unpaid  leave or short
time working and that this share had doubled  since June 1992. Moreover, other evidence  suggests  that
in significant  numbers  of state firms, management  has effecLively  lost control over labour  discipline  17;
a further negative  shock to labour  productivity.
The strategy of choosing  unpaid leave or short timework could be consistent  with the general
reluctance to impose  involuntary  separations  and rather induce  active  job search behaviour  or secondary
employment  by de facto reducing wages and time allocations  in primary employment. But the World
Bank survey did not find that this was a wholly generalized  process.  There was evidence  that use of
involuntary leave and short time work had increased over 1992 but by 1992.3 under 35  % of firms
reported use of the first and 17% use of the second procedures. In sum, under 5% of the total labour
force was on prolonged involuntary  leave; and nearly 90% were concentrated  in machine  building and
light industry.  Firm-specific  output changes were, as expected, inversely correlated with involuntary
leave.  A further 5  % of workers  were reported on short time work but 70  % of those on short time were
from one firm.  Unfortunately,  the data on short-time  work and unpaid leave remain  fragmentary  and do
not allow us to get a clear picture.
A number  of further nuances  in the changes  to employment  can be observed  in the regional  data.
First, there is more variance in  1992 with several regions --  the North Western region, including St.
Petersburg, and military dominated enclave, Kaliningrad  --  experiencing  employment  contraction of
between 4-5%.  Decline in employment  in the rmilitary  sectors is likely to account  for a significant  share
17  Though this does not show up in addiitional  claims for sick pay - a time honoured method of shirking.Wage and Enmlovment  Decision2s  20
of the fall in employment  in the North West.  But in general, this association  cannot be assumed.  We
observe no major job losses in other heavily military dominated  regions, such as the Urals, even if
anecdotal  reports speak of huge drops in output.  For two oblasts - Ncvosibirsk  and Saratov - where
we know that military employment  ranged between  43-51  % of total enmployment  pre-1991, we observe
no markedly  stronger downward  pressure on employment. Second, for industry,  employiline contraction
over 1991/1992  appears  slightly  lower than for the state sector  as a whole. Moreover, branch data show
stationary  or slightly increasing  employment  in 1992  Tor  all branches  bar engineering. Almost the entire
change in industrial  employment  in 1992  can be attributed  to changes  in the machine  building and light
sectors.
While the story on  the state-side of  the employment  picture is of gradual job destruction,
alongside a rather high degree of churning  - with workers  moving at quite high rates between firms -
the picture with respect to the private and cooperative  sectors - the sectors in which we might expect
some  job creation  - is less evident. Thus is partly because  of confusion  arising from the very widespread
reclassification  of title that has been occuring  in both years 's.
In the case of cooperatives,  official survey data show a 40% decline in employment  between
January and July 1992, while private firms' employment  increased  by over 10%.  Even so, this would
imply that combined employment in these categories in mid-1992 comprised no more 3% of total
employment. Further, the relatively high share of secondary  workers  - 16% as against  the economy-
wide average of 3.5% - suggests  that many  of these firms may be small, part-time  operations. It seems
likely that official data capture very inexactly  the path of private sector employment  and likely grossly
underestimate.
2.3: Employment Changes: Firm Level Data
Official data covering the state sector also appears  subject to measurement  error, in part arising
from a breakdown  in traditional  reporting  procedures  and coverage. This makes firm level data attractive
as a countercheck. We can explore employment  decisions  in more detail using the World Bank survey
results, as well as information  from the ILO dataset.  The former, in particular, yields some striking
results that can be summarized along the following  broad lines; (i) high rates of turnover, especially
among workers, (ii) very low levels of involuntary  separations  across all firm size classes  and branches,
"8  The  ILO  survey  in June reports  27%  of establishments  classed  as leasehold,  55%  state  and 18%  private  but
the distinction  is not, it appears, very meaningful  in terms  of economic  behaviour. The state  sector may be
shrinking  fast  (down  8%  over their  sample  between  September  1991  and  June  1992)  but primarily  by means  of title
changes.Wage and Emplovment  Decisions  21
Table 5:  Emrloyment Changes over 1992, 3rd Quarter
Separation, Hiring and Vacancy Rates (% of labour force)
Firm Size
1  2  3  4  5
Separations  10.5  10.0  9.5  5.7  7.8
Hires  7.2  3.7  4.8  2.5  9.9
Net Separations  3.7  7.0  5.2  3.3  -2.2
Expected  Separ-
ations in 92.4  2.4  2.4  2.3  0.5  0.5
Vacancies  1.5  3.1  1.0  2.2  1.9
Posted Vacancy  0.1  1.0  0.7  0.9  1.1
Firm Size Categories: 1=  80-350;  2=  351-700; 3=  701-900;  4=  901-1500; 5=  > 1501
employees
Source: World Bank Survey
Table 6:  Job Separations by Type
(% of total separations)
Firm Size
1  2  3  4  5
Quits  62.2  52.3  52.9  43.4  52.7
Disciplinary  8.5  3.2  3.4  7.7  4.7
Employment
Reduction  10.4  31.3  10.7  ?7.1  3.1
Other  19.9  13.2  33.0  11.8  39.5
Source: World Bank SurveyWage and Ernplovment  Decisions  22
(iii) considerable  new hiring by firms, largely to replace  separating workers and, ronsequently, (iv). a
generally low level of job losses through 1992.
For the firms sampled  in the World Bank survey it is notable that while nearly three-quarters  of
th- sample reported net employment  losses  for the third quarter of 1992, over 25% actuallv  posted net
employment  gains. Further, in one quarter  alone nearly 3  % of the labour  force experienced  some labour
market iransition. The main results are condensed  in Table 5. Several points emerge. First, for 1992.3
total separations  amounted  to around 8/10% across  the firm size  classes and the separation  rate was fairly
evenly distributed. Second, net job losses were much smaller, amounting to no more than 5% for the
total sample. The dispersion is fairly low but in general net job  losses are more concentrated  among
smaller firms. Indeed,  the largest  firms actually  experienced  net increases  to their work-forces. Expected
job losses o 'er the fourth quarter that are reported are similarly  low and inversely  associated  with firm
size.
The ILO establishment  survey  provides  a longer  perspective. Over the period  end 1990/end  1991
employment  in .he 5%00  establishments  fell by around 7%; that over 80% of firms cut employment  and
that this was fairly evenly distributed across industrial branches, save for  food processing sector.
Further,  for roughly 20% of the establishments  (109) that were  re-surveyed in June  1992, total
employment decline since end-1990 was  15%.  Between September 1991 and  June  1992 alone
employment  fell by over 8% in their sample and over two-fifths of the establishments  expected  further
employment  cuts. But employment  changes  in 1992  appear  uncorrelated  with changes  in sales and display
no very striking  or systematic  differences  over property forms  1.
The evident  acceleration  in job separations  in 1991  and 1992  only very partially  substantiates  the
claim  that a major change  in behaviour  on the part of firms is occurring. The lack of a robust association
of employment  changes  to sales changes  (and by implication,  to output changes)  points to a generalized
but fairly weak process of labour releases  and gross flows  induced  by a change in employment  rules and
wage setting practice.  It is revealing  that the continuing high rates of turnover remain dominated  by
voluntary quits.  Explicit  job reduction decisions  displayed  considerable  variance and amounted to no
more than  17.5  % of gross job losses  for the full sample. Total involuntary  separations  amounted  to less
than a quarter of reported  total separations. This pattern similarly  emerges in the ILO data. The principal
reasons for involuntary  separation  remain 'conduct rather than the current or predicted  path of output
"  It should  be noted  that  both  the World Bank and ILO  survey  results  were generated in regions and oblasts
with relatively  high levels  of job losses relative to other regions.Wage and Ermployment  Decisions  23
and/or demand. Falling  demand for firm output  was cited in less than 3 % of cases as a factor motivating
forced separations.  Indeed, gross flows were primarily voluntary -- 72% of turnover was through
resignation and under 10% were dismissals. Survey evidence  thus suggests  that voluntary rather than
involuntary  separations  have dominated  and that these quits  appear motivated  by changes  in relative  wages
and to have been concentrated  among  unskilled  workers. There is some evidence  that forced  separations
have also been concentrated  among unskilled  manual workers  and, to a lesser extent, among  temporary
labour  20,
Despite considerable  difficulties  in interpreting  employment  changes due to data inadequacies,
the overriding  impression  is of significant  inertia. For a start, the absence  of a robust association  between
sales and employment  changes  suggests that gross labour flows conditioned  on relative wage changes
resulting  from relaxation  of centralized  controls  hLve  dominated. There is, for example,  no evidence  that
establishment  employment  changes  have been associated  with job losses among  women and pensioners;
groups that one might hypothesize to be at greater risk.  The  respective datasets dc  not pennit
identification  of the destination  of quits.  Consequently,  we have no way of capturing exits out of the
labour force.  However, the information  on the characteristics  of those who quit through 1991  suggests
that exit from the labour force was not the dominant  motivation.
The ILO data on vacancies  indicate  rather low speads across branches  for end 1991. Vacancies
averaged  about 6%/;  were fairly evenly  distributed  over property forms and firm size and were higher for
firms that had experienced  the largest employment  losses.  The vacancy rate declines more sharply in
1992, dropping  over 40% over September  1991  for the same sample of firms.  The World Bank sampled
firms reported very low vacancy rates for 1992.3, equivalent  to under 2% of current employment  wiLh
even lower postings at the Labour  Offices.
Interpretation  of the vacancy  data remains  difficult  given divergences in reporting practices  and
in confusion over the underlying, 'desired' level and structure of manning.  This partly explains the
conjoint existence  of high turnover  rates and a continuing,  widespread  perception  of labour  surpluses or
underemployment  in firms. Indeed,  given  technoiogy,  a re-arrangement  of relative  wages, resulting  from
an institutional shock and from ex ante firm-level  mismatch, could exacerbate that mismatch  as firms
compete  for particular types of workers. This might not show up in the aggregate  vacancy posting. One
notes that despite  a clear majority  of firms reporting  aggregate  excess  employment  amounting  to between
20 Note  that temporary  labour  amounted  to no more  than 1I%  of total industrial  employment  in 1991.Wage and Em2loyment  Decisions  24
5-20% of current workforces  21, marv firms still complain of selective labour shortages, resulting in
upward wage adjustments to  attract labour.  As  in  the past,  perceived labour shortages appear
concentrated  among  skilled,  manual  workers. The dominance  of quits could then reasonably  be expected
to be associated with the continued  posting of vacancies  alongside  complaints  of over-staffing. These
factors indicate  a certain stability  of objectives  across industrial firms and reinforce  the view that gross
flows were largely driven by institutional  shocks rather than by a process of firmn-level  restructuring.
Consequently, involuntary  separations  have remained at rather low levels, given the size of negative
shocks to output.
3: Unemployment
The spectre of mass unemployment  in Russia haunts current policy discussions. Generalized
output losses and the recognition  that structural changes are likely to induce significant  job destruction
only partially offset by job creation  in growing sectors, including  the private, promote this anxiety. As
yet, however, it is only a spectre.  Although  the changes  to measured  unemployment  have  been significant
in absolute numbers, they have started from a very low base.  This is not to say that job losses are
unlikely  to occur, merely  that the apparently  dominant  strategy of firms over 1991  and 1992  has not been
to induce large scale forced separations. Further, as relative wages and benefits have been subject to
larger movement  than the aggregate  data capture, turnover has remained  high and separations  in 1991
remained dominated  by quits.  What is sLriking  is that this broad picture remains only partly modified
by the autumn of 1992. In summary,  such adjustment  as there has been  has largely been  borne by wages
(and possibly by benefits)  with little change  on the quantities  side.
Different shocks  have their counterparts in the type of unemployment  generated. In principle,
some component of changes  in employment  can be attributed to aggregate, sectoral and labour supply
shocks. Given the nature of reform  one might expect sectoral shocks  to have larger than normal effects
on both demand (unemployment)  and supply  sides (vacancies)  of the labour  market 1. Further, we rnight
expect the latter to be non-trivial, given ex ante high participation  rates across sexes.  This might be
offset if a decline in real incomes - hence substitution effect - dominates.  At this stage, we lack
sufficient infornation to pin down the extent of exit from the labour force.
21  The World  Bank  survey  has  65  %  of firms  reporting  excess  employment  in 1992.3  with  that  excess  amounting
to roughly  5% of current  employment.  The  higher  -- 20% -- figure  is derived from  the ILO  survey.
22 At least relative  to North  America  where aggregate activity shocks have generally been found to shift
unemploymeut  and vacancy  rates  the  most. See Blanchard  and Diamond  (1989).Russia: Unemployment  Measures
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Figure 5 plots the path of unemployment  over several measures  for the latter part of 1991 and
the first ten months of 1992. Using the more inclusive measure  - see Box 1 - we observe a doubling
of registered  job searchers and the unemployment  rate for this measure between December 1991 and
October 1992.  After initially sharp monthly acceleration,  we notice some deceleration  in the rate of
increase to this measure  after May 1992. This is true for all three measures  of unemployment,  includng
benefits recipients (Figure 6).  It is possible that this can be related to the overt shift in the monetary
stance of the Central Bank.  Inflows to the jobseeking pool appear to stabilize between June and
September  (Figures 7-8).  By October 1992  the Russian  unemployment  rate amountei o no more than
1.5%.  For those formally classified as unemployed  - the narrow measure - the unemployment  rate
amounted to only 0.7% in the same month.
Data on the regional distribution  of unemployment  is revealing in a number of respects (Table
7).  First, while the major share of total unemployment  (c22%) remains concentrated  in the Central
Region, which includes  Moscow, there is relatively  little apparent  dispersion in unemployment  rates by
region.  Using the broad measure of job searchers, the Northern Region has consistently  the highest
unemployment  rate but tilis is less than a percentage  point  higher than the Russia mean. We do observe
a  slight increase in the standard deviation and coefficient of variation across regions in the later
observations  post-June 1992  but in general we observe relatively  little dispersion  in the growth rates of
unemployment  across regions.  This points to a fairly widespread  and apparently  cormmon  process in the
generation  of unemployment  across regions, albeit at relatively  low frequencies  3.
With respect to inflows to unemployment  we can pick out transitions  induced  by mass lay-offs
in the firm sector.  This provides a very crude proxy for measuring  any apparent shake-out  associated
with some regime change and accelerated  employment  separations. Figure 8 gives gross inflows to the
broad measure of unemployment  with inflows originating  from mass layoffs or explicit actions of job
reduction.  It is revealing that by the end of the period, gross inflows are largely dominated by mass
layoffs, even if the aggregate level of the monthly  inflows  has moved within  reasonably  narrow bounds.
In stock terms, just over 40% of both broad and narrow  unemployment  measures  in October 1992 were
composed  of people who had been  separated  through mass lay-offs. Further - with the exception  of the
Central Region, comprising  Moscow,  where we find a disproportionately  high level of layoffs - regional
2  We  can  isolate  pockets  of relatively  high  unemployment  - Yaroslav  oblast  in the Centre  region  and parts of
Northern  Caucasus,  for example.  But  at present  we lack  sufficient  information  to pick  up  the  deterrninants  of local
unemployment.TabLe  7
Regional  Unemployment  Rates  Volgo-  Central PovolzhskNorthern  Western Eastern Far
RUSSIA  Nortih  NorthWestcentre  Viatsky Chernoze,  Caucasus  Ural  Siberia Siberia East  Kalintngi Jan  92  0.7  1.3  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.R  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.9 Feb.  0.8  1.3  0.7  0.8  0.7  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  1.0 Mar.  0.9  1.5  0.9  0.9  0.9  1.0  0.9  0.9  0.8  1.0  ^.Q  0.9  1.2 Apr.  1.1  1.7  1.0  1.1  0.9  1.2  1.0  1.0  0.9  1.1  1.0  1.1  1.4 Mlay  1.1  1.7  1.1  1.2  1.0  1.2  1.0  1.1  0.9  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.6 June  1.2  1.7  1.3  1.2  1.1  1.3  1.1  1.2  0.9  1.3  1.1  1.2  1.7 July  1.3  1.9  1.5  1.3  1.2  1.4  1.1  1.2  1.0  1.4  1.1  1.3  1.8 Aug.  1.4  2.0  1.6  1.4  1.3  1.4  1.2  1.4  1.1  1.5  1.2  1.3  1.9 Sept.  1.4  2.2  1.6  1.5  1.5  1.3  1.2  1.4  1.1  1.3  1.1  1.3  2.1 Cct  92  1.5  2.4  1.8  1.6  1.6  1.3  1.3  1.4  1.2  1.4  1.2  1.4  2.3
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Russia: Gross  Flows  to  Unemployment






















Feb  Mar  Apr  May  June  July  Aug  Sept  Oct
1 992
'O  Gross Inflows  +  Inflows from  loyoffWage and Emplovment  Decisions  31
data show such separations to be fairly uniformly distributed  with surprisingly little dispersion in the
changes. This again points to a common  response  function  and path across regions.
Information regarding the composition  of the unemployed and their respective durations is
fragmentary. Nevertheless,  Tables 8 and 9 provide partial evidence  in terms of the sex and age of the
unemployed, both broad and narrow measures, as well as one observation  on durations for July 1992.
We can see that in areas of relatively  high unemployment  -- the Northern  and Moscow regions as also
Kaliningrad -- unemployment  durations are already more protracted. Around Moscow, nearly 20% of
registered unemployed reported durations  of between 8-12 months already in July 1992.  The second
striking feature is the weight of females in total unemployment  and its continuous  distribution over
respective  durations  of unemployment. At least 70  % of the unemployed  and over 75  % of those receiving
benefits  were women on 1  July 1992. The table also indicates  a significant  share of youth unemployment,
suggesting  that a non-trivial  number of unemployed  are new entrants to the labour force.  Additional
information  on the skill and other attributes  of the unemployed  also indicate  a strong bias toward white
collar workers.  In other words, unemployment  has yet to hit severely the core of the male, blue collar
workforce.
Outflows from unemployment  show a somewhat  surprisingly  small downward  slope with fairly
small variance  over the first ten months of 1992. For those leaving unemployment  to jobs we observe
little if any change in absolute  numbers from February 1992  onwards  and in the rratio  of job finds to total
outflows  but an obvious fall in the ratio of job finds to the stock of unemployed  (Fig 9).  This appears
to tally with the available economy-wide  data on hires that indicates  a continuing  high volume of hiring
in the  economy through  1992.  The fact that a  consistent 40% and more. of  the outflows from
unemployment  are reported as finding  jobs is itself reasonably  striking in a context of large cumulative
output  declines and widespread  reductions  in capacity. Further, for September  and October 1992  the data
allows us to focus a little more sharply on the efficiency  of job finds. Over 30% of those who found a
job did so within  ten days of registering  as unemployed. It is unlikely  that this 30% would have received
benefits for their unemployment  spell.
Several points can be made with regard to the path of vacancies. In the first place, we observe
a clear and sharp rise in posted vacancies  until September  1991. Thereafter,  vacancies  fall significantly.
Posted labour demand by firms at the labour office (a more reliable measure than vacancies)  fall byTabLe  8  32
Distribution  of unemployed  and  recepients  of benefits  by duration,  July,1,1992
All sample  0  f  w h  i c h:
TOTAL  tt  Young(Agel6-29)  W o m e  n
Persons  TOTAL  %%  TOTAL  tt
Persons  to total  Persons to total
stock  stock
UNEMPLOYMENT
TOTAL  202882  100  64195  31.6  144297  71.1
Duration  <1 month  54617  26.9  16870  30.9  37977  69.5
of Unempll-4months  99739  49.2  33415  33.5  72046  72.2
4-Smonths  35823  17.6  11376  31.8  26110  72.2
8m-lyear  12697  6.3  2534  20  8164  64.3
REC. BENEFITS
TOTAL  107671  100  35271  32.8  82787  76.9
Duration  <1 month  27480  25.5  8816  32.1  20742  75.5
of Rec.  1-4months  58794  54.6  20450  34.8  45140  76.8
4-Smonths  18062  16.8  f  5500  30.5  14208  78.7
8m-lyear  3335  3.1  50S  15.1  2697  80.9Table  9
UNEMPLOYMENT  DURATIONS  BY REGIONS  July  1 1992
Isharesi  Volgo-  Central  PovolzhskNorthern  Yestern  Eastern  Far
RUSSIA  North  NorthWestCentre  Vlatsky  Chernozem  Caucasus Ural  Siberia  Siberia  East  Kaltningr
UNEMPLOYMENT
TOTAL  Persons  202882  16260  27076  46412  14605  6658  13288  26054  22077  12988  5860  8268  1906
Duratton  <1 month  27  24  39  22  29  27  27  22  26  30  30  20  19
of Unempil-4months  49  44  45  44  55  51  51  50  58  53  53  52  51
t%  4-8.onths  18  29  12  17  14  19  la  24  14  15  14  17  26
8m-lyear  6  3  4  17  2  3  4  4  2  2  3  3  4
REC. BENEFITS
TOTAL  Persons  107671  5740  10008  19420  9570  4683  10755  13257  15432  7852  3508  5619  1180
Duration  <1 month  25  26  25  28  26  24  25  19  26  30  28  25  22
of Rec.  1-4months  55  49  51  56  59  52  5i  56  57  51  54  56  53
it  4-Bmonthe  17  21  17  13  13  21  18  23  15  17  16  16  2'
8m-tyear  3  4  7  3  2  3  4  2  2  2  2  3  1
1, ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~-
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around 50% between  January and October 1992  2.  As Figure 10 shows, unemployment  and vacancies
move in opposite  directions,  suggesting  more the dominance  of aggregate  rather than  reallocation  shocks.
This contrasts, say, with Poland in  1990 and  1991.  There, vacancies initially increased and then
decelerated rather gradually even as the unemployment  rate shifted up over eight percentage points,
suggesting  the presence  of mismatch  and mobility  constraints. But for Russia, there appears  to be clear
negative  correlation between  regional unemployment  rates and the vacancy to unemployed  ratio as well
as considerable  convergence in the changes for regional vacancies.  These features suggest, at -first
approximation,  the process to have been  dominated  by aggregate-type  shocks  and that reallocation  effects
have as yet been weaker.  Of course, we are unable presently to get a proper handle on durations and
hence on separating out not only the weight  of changes in average duration on unemployment  but also
in determining  the effectiveness  of job search  behaviour  by the unemployed. But an obvious assumption
would be that a reduction in search effectiveness  would leave vacancies broadly unchanged even as
uner ployment rises.  By contrast, we currently observe an inverse movement of unemployment  and
vacancies.
The rapid expansion in the numbers eligible for benefits - from under 19% of the narrow
unemployment  measure in December 1991  to 60% in September 1992  - can primarily  be explained  by
the lagged feed-through  of unemployed  after exhaustion  of severance  pay arrangements  and the declinuing
share of new entrants  and other non-eligible  benefits  categories. It also raises the issue  of financing  tiese
benefits. The replacement  ratio has averaged  57% of the previous  year's wage over the eligible year of
benefits payment.  At first inspection,  this ratio seems high; most OECD countries  have similar ra;ios
for gross benefits  to gross wages.  But several  caveats are in order.  First, benefits  are not indexed Lnd
with high, rising inflation  the result has been that most benefits  payments  collapse to the minimum  level.
Second, given the importance  of non-cash  elenents in average wages, inclusion  of such benefits would
likely radically lower the effective replacement  ratio.
Box 1
Unemployment:
Measurement  and Institutional  Issues
24  We  should  note  that  most  ( > 85  %)  of these  posted  vacancies  are for  manual  workers,  reflecting  the  historical
bias in the  composition  of labour  demand  of Russian  firms.35
Fig  9
Russia:  Unemployment  inflow  and  outflow


















Jon 92  Feb  Mar  Apr,  May  June  July  Aug  Sept  Oct
1992
0  Inflows  +  Outs(job finds)  0  Outs (ex.job  finds)  a  Total Outflowsfig  10  36
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Russian  statistics  measure  unemployment  in a variety of ways. The broad category  of jobseekers
includes  people lacking full or part time work who  are looking  for work  and have registered  in a Labour
Office. These would  include,  demobilized  military, retrenched  staff-- including  those  dismissed  by mass
lay-offs from firms -- new entrants, people returning to the labour force as well as those voluntarily
quitting  previous  employment. Workers  dismissed  by firms have the right  to a maximum  of three months
severance and initially get classified in this pool,  rather than among the unemployed  and benefits
receivers.
A sub-category  are those with the status of unemployed,  the narrow measure. These include in
principle  all active  job searchers  who cannot be matched  with employment  by the Labour  Office. At the
end of 1991 this category arnounted  to around 13% of total jobseekers but has risen through 1992 to
nearly 40%.  This path is primarily governed by the reclassification  of jobless two months after
severance.
Benefits  are paid to only a fraction of those  classified  as unemployed,  using  the narrow  measure.
At end 1991 this amounted  to around 18% of the latter, rising by September  1992  to 60%.  To receive
benefits, an individual  must have at least one year's work history and be actively  searching  for work.
Those dismnissed  for disciplinary  reasons cannot  claim benefits  and refusal of two appropriate  job offers
results in loss of benefits.  For the first three months of unemployment,  dole amounts  tc 75% of an
individual's  average wage over the previous year, falling to 60% for months 3-7 and 45% for months
7-12.  After a year, benefits eligibility  ceases, save for those individuals  with work histories  exceeding
25 years.  In these cases, each year of service over 25 years adds an additional  week of benefits
eligibility.  For those with under one year's work experience  or with very low prior wage history, a
minimum  benefit equal to the rninimurn  wage is paid.  Benefits  are paid out of the Employment  Fund
financed  by 1  % employer contribution  and budgetary  transfers.
Currently, discussions  for the new Employment  Law are underway  and these  aim to translate  the
present  system  into a flat-rated  structure  with payments  set for six months  at 125  % of the minimum  wage,
falling to 75% after six months. Benefits  will rise by 10% for each dependent  with maximum  benefits
capped at 90% of the last three months' wages. Benefits  duration is proposed  to rise to 18 months.
4: Employment, Output and Relative  Prices
To this point, we have concentrated  exclusively  on the institutional  setting  and path of labour
market variables in the recent period.  The exercise was necessary  given  problems  in the data and the
inherent  difficulties  of adequately  mapping  recent changes. We now, of course, need  to make  an explicit
link to the real side of the economy.
Data on output movements  are difficult  to interpret. First, because  of the traditional  preference
for using constant  price indicators with unclear specification  of the underlying  price indices. Second,
because reasonably significant  shares of output likely escape the statistical  net.  What data that are
available  clearly indicate  strong downward  shifts in output across a broad range  of sectors  and goods in
the early part of 1992. Contrasting  physical  output in Jan/Feb 1992  with the same months  of 1991 for
25 branches  of industry, the unweighted  average  decline  is around 14%. A sample  of most firms across
eight  branches  of industry  indicates  that output  declined  by around 13/15  % comparing  Jan/Mar 1992  withWage and Ernloyment Decisions  38
Table 10: Responses by Russian Firms to Changes in Key Variables; January  - June 1992 (%  of
responses  by size dass and response)
Firm Employment  Size
<200  201-500  501-1000  >1001
Output
+  31  22  22  15
18  22  16  21
51  56  62  64
Raw Material  Stocks
+  55  55  64  61
18  17  11  6
27  28  25  33
Finished Goods Stocks
+  60  69  70  78
27  15  13  8
13  16  17  14
Employment
+  16  19  21  29
40  25  20  14
44  56  59  57
Demand
+  14  13  20  11
33  22  24  18
53  65  56  71
Imports
+  20  20  20  18
30  60  27  21
50  20  53  61
Exports
+  0  20  6  25
67  53  50  30
33  27  44  45
Source: Russian  GoskomstatWage and Em2lovment  Decisions  39
Jan/Mar 1991. Over the same peried, employment  contracted  bv only 3%.  Seasonally  adjusted value
data for industry also indicate  the same order of magnitude  for the decline over the first half of 1992.
Comparing  Jan-September  1992  with the same period in 1991  for industry identifies  a 17.6% fall (not
seasonally adjusted) 1.
Branch  and sectoral data for Jan/Aug 1992 over the same period in 1991 indicate  gross output
falls of between  8-30%. The variance  does increase across observations  but removing  construction  and
light industry  accounts for most of this increase.  Survey  data reporting changes  in capacity  utilization
between  end-1991 and June 1992  show a 8.5% fall.  Again, we observe little increase in the standard
deviation over branches  of industry and the impression  is reinforced of a largely aggregative  shock to
output with low dispersion in the changes in capacity utilization  across branches. Aggregate  data on
manhours for the major sectors over 1992 - a crude proxy for capacity  - show a generalized  upward
drift, measured over January to April 1992, with a sharpish fall thereafter.  In May and June 1992,
industrial manhours  were down  between  9-15  %  % over the beginning  of the year, although  this ignores
any seasonal  factors.
Table 10 reports  the results from a large sample  of firms undertaken  by the Ministry  of Economy
in mid-1992.  It groups responses by firm employment  size and with respect to a  number of key
variables.  It is notable that output decline was present in over 55% of cases, employment  losses in a
slightly lower number. Unambiguously  negative  demand  shocks  were reported for between  53-71  % of
cases with the largest firms hit hardest. The overall impression  is that output losses  have been widely
distributed but have been stronger for larger firms.  Similarly forecasts of output, employment  and
demand changes  for the second  half of 1992  were consistently  more pessimistic  in the case of the larger
firms.
Informnation  from the World Bank survey provides some further information  on changes  in the
volume  of output  over 1992. By November  1992, 58% of firms had experienced  a clear decline  in output
over 1992 (see Tables 11 and 12).  The unweighted  mean projection for the year was 20/25% with
around half the firms with output decline reporting over that range.  15  % of respondents reported
increases  in output  with the remaining  27% projecting  roughly  constant  output  volume. While aggregate
data show engineering  and light industry  to have  been hardest  hit, the survey indicates  a somewhat  mixed
response, with just under half engineering  firms reporting  constant  or increasing  output. Further, in the
2  See World  Bank  (1992a)  and Goskomstat.Wage and EmDloyment  Decisions  40
case of declining  firms, the output loss was considerably  below the full sample mean. Nevertheless,  the
clear impression  is of a common  shock across branches  and sectors with, however, fair dispersion  in the
size of the negative  changes.
5: Aggregate  and Structural  Shocks
5.1: A Simple Taxonomy of Effects
We can describe the  process in simple  terms. The Russian  economy  has been subject  to negative
shocks combining  both demand  and supply  side effects. We ignore which dominates at this stage. But
given selective price liberalization, some trade liberalization  and the collapse of prior domestic and
regional trading arrangements,  we can assume that we are observing a combination  of aggregate and
structural shocks, the disentangling  of which is far from straightforward. Aggregate  shocks could  have
been channelled  through changes  in macroeconomic  policy, such as a deflation  of household  demand  for
firm output through negative income and wealth effects.  Similarly, with a financial system separating
household and firm accounts, a restrictive credit policy could likewise induce a fall in money and
ultimately, output 26  On the supply side, we have two obvious, possible channels.  The first is that
originating with the collapse of part of intra-CIS and  CMEA trade, leading, in certain cases, to
quantitative  shortfalls. Output in certain activities appears to have been constrained by lack of inputs
availability. Second, are the  possible  effects  associated  with both changes  to domestic administered  prices
and resulting from trades with other CIS entities. A clear candidate would be relative energy prices.
Such a relative price effect would likely impart a common  upward shift in firms' production costs and
have aggregate  effects if there was low dispersion  in the ex ante ratio of energy to total costs across
firms 27
Structural shocks would be  linked to  shifts in  the pattern of demand and competitiveness
contingent  on a new price level and set of relative  prices and hence  would generate  differentiated  sectoral
outcomes  with respect to real variables.  Unlike  the small open ec.onomy  case, that new set of relative
prices could not be largely imported  through trade opening. Further, given partial price decontrol, we
would expect reallocation  shocks  to be driven primarily by the exogenously  given reduction in demand
for particular  goods; military  goods are a relevant  case.  And indeed we observe some evidence  of this
in the first half of 1992.
26  For this  argument,  in this context  of Poland  in 1990,  see Calvo  and Coricelli  (1992).
27 This  is not so unreal  a view  given  the  common  lack  of any prior incentive  to economize  on energy.Wage and  Emplovment Decisions  41
Table  11  Physical Output  in 1992: Direction of
Change
Decline  Constant  Increase  No reply  TOTAL
BY EMPL.
SIZE *
1  2  6  2  0  10
2  6  1  3  1  11
3  7  3  0  0  10
4  6  0  1  0  7
4  2  1  0  0  3
1---~~~~~~~~---  . .---
TOTAL  23  11  6  1  41
Table 12  Physical Output in 1992: Direction of
Change by Branch
Decline  Constant  Increase  No reply  TOTAL
BY
BRANCH  _
Metall.  4  0  0  0  4
Chemic.  1  0  1  0  2
Machin.  3  2  2  1  8
Bld.Matr.  3  1  0  0  4
Light  4  2  1  0  7
Food  2  0  0  0  2
Agro  2  0  0  0  2
Constr.  1  4  0  0  5
Trade  1  1  1  0  3
Science  2  1  1  0  4
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Let us start with shocks  emanating  from macroeconomic  policy. Two obvious  candidates  would
be  a  fall in  real monetary balances and real wages.  An objective of the Russian Government's
programme in the first part of 1992 was a policy of restrictive credit and tight money, alongside  price
liberalization.  The price jump - consumer prices increased 245%, producer prices '82%  between
December 1991 and January 1992 - was indeed large.  The consequences were  various, some
unintended. Nevertheless,  it is evident  that measured  real wages did fall and that this was also true for
households' real monetary balances. The fall in measured real wages was further exaggerated  by the
structure of,  apd  inefficiencies, in the financial system provoking widespread cash shortages and
accumulation  of wage arrears by firms.  As wages could  only be paid using cash (nalichnyi) rather than
non-cash (beznalichnyi)  rubles, constraints  on the former could have direct implications for current
ability  to pay wages. Thus, a certain  share of nominal  wage  claims over the second  half of 1991  and first
half of 1992 were not satisfied  due to currency shortages. By July 1992, shortly prior to the printing  of
larger denomination  bills, wage arrears attributed  to cash shortages amounted  to 220 billion roubles or
roughly 12% of current broad money stock.  In certain enterprises this led to forced borrowing from
workers of the order of 3/4 months wages; a significant  negative shock to current household income
streams  given current monthly inflation  (Figure 11) s.
Negative  shocks  to firms' output  coming  from household  demand  and government  spending  could
be expected  to show up in part in inventory  behaviour.  Indeed, it is generally held that firms have
accumulated  inventory  over 1992. Table 10 indicates  that raw material stocks increased  in roughly 60%
of cases and finished  goods in 70  %. Striking  is the fact that finished  goods inventory  rose more for large
firms than other categories. This compounds  the very sharp reported increase in inventory  that occurred
through 1991 . Preliminary information  suggests  that in 1991  inventory accumulation  was primarily  of
raw materials; in 1992  of finished  goods. Further, assuming  that Kornai's proposition  regarding  excess
inventories in socialist economies held ex ante 29,  this would imply very high levels of  inventory
accumulation  - both of finished goods and raw materials - relative, say, to OECD levels.  Given
negative real interest rates, uncertainty  with respec. to supplies, prices and government policy, firms
continued  to accumulate  inventory  in the expectation  of a combination  of bail-outs, windfalls  via inflation
as well as inertia in objec-tives. The implications  of this intertemporal  substitution  effect for a genuine
28 Yasin  (1992)  cites  these  figures  but we have  no good  information  regarding  the number  of firms  and their
distribution  running  wage  arrears.
29  See Komai  (1980)Wage and Emplovment  Decisions  43
regime break with a binding credit constraint on firms will likely be extra-large  current output losses
given excess ex ante inventory.
5.2: Credit  Shocks  and Interenterprise  Borrowing
Anticipations  of credit tightening and upward movement of  interest rates motivated sharp
increases  in interenterprise  borrowing.  Arrears  shifted from around 39 billion rubles  at end-1991  to near
3.1 trillion by June before  declining  to c.600/650 billion at end-September  following  an increase in the
money  stock to cover a share of arrears. It seems likely  that arrears are currently  mounting  again, given
the expectation  by firms of future  de facto bail-outs  via this route 30.
Schematically,  the first part of 1992 could be summarized  as an attempt to impose fiscal and
monetary restraint.  Measures  of real money, narrow and broad, show significant  cuts, particularly  in
January 1992.  Credit to the economy was likewise cut sharply to not much over a quarter of the
December  1991  level. By July and August,  however, we clearly  observe the effects  of the Central  Bank's
decision to jump the money  supply  and, in particular,  raise the supply  of credit to firms. Credit to firms
(Figure 12) in July was over a third higher in real terms than in January 1992 and on a rising trend.
This process is complex, combining elements of coordinated behaviour  31 with institutional
particularities  and problems  directly  associated  with interrepublican  financial  and trade flows.  But for
our purposes, the result  that is important  is that demand  for firms' output  appears  to have faller less than
might have  been initially  implied  by the announced  monetary  stance of govermnent. The increase  in both
measures  of money  and credit post-July  reflects  the validation  by the Central Bank  of the claims  by firms
implicit in their arrears to each other.  Indeed, credits to commercial  banks, primnarily  for covering
arrears, have increased  significantly  in real terms throughout  1992 so that by mid-1992  a simultaneous
and substantial  expansion  of credit to both firms and banks had occurred.
If the combined  response  of firms to the announced  policy changes  was to accumulate  arrears  and
inventory, the obvious result would be a  higher level of current output. Further, the presence of
interenterprise  arrears may partly explain the different paths of producer and consumer  prices through
1992.  The negative  demand shock to households  dominated  that to firms, given the latter's ability to
accumulate  arrears.
30 See discussion  in Granville  (1992b). But note they  may  no longer  take the form of arrears  given  the
accomodating  monetary  stance  of the Central  Bank.
31 The  coordination  arose  from  an explicit  political  challenge  to government  prinarily  articulated  by the  Civic
Union  as well  as through  de facto  coordination  arisiiig  from  high  concentration  in the industrial  structure.Fig  11
Russia:  Price  Changes
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5.3: The Financial  System and the Wage Constraint
If we hypothesize  that, given  the institutional  controls  in Russian  firms, the primary  objective  has
been to meet current wage claims  holding  employment  broadly  constant  (see Appendix  2) this ability was
potentially  constrained  not only by demand  for firms' output  but also by several institutional  features ".
Until 1991  an effective  wall existed  between  cash  and non-cash  or bezmalichnyi  rubles. The former  were
used to satisfy wage claims, the latter constituted  the bulk of transactions  between firms, banks and
wholesalers. Monetary  balances  of firms thus comprised  cash and non-cash  rubles. By 1992  it is clear
that the distinction  betwen  the two types of money  was effectively  broken.  However, until the second
half of the year most transactions remained non-cash.  For example, receivables  have largely been
classified as non-cash  or beznalichnyi rubles. On the assumption  that most firms believed  (or are forced
to  believe by a credit queue) that arrears will be covered by the central authorities, their short-run
objective remained for the first part of  1992 maximization  of cash income.  This ii 1 turn could be
decomposed  into two aspects. The first was to trade or barter with other firms in ways  that realized  cash
(rather than non-cash) rubles. Cash transactions  that did not pass through the banking system were
particularly attractive. Cash rubles held in banks remained  subject to the usual deductions  when used to
pay wages.  These deductions  amounted  to between 30-60% on each cash ruble  33.  Non-cash rubles
could be translated  into  cash rubles but would  in addition  incur a higher bank commission  charge. Thus,
gross revenues reflected in firms' monetary holdings in the banking system or in liquidity were the
primary  determinant  of wages.  This was  further  complicated  by the importance  of the second  facto.. This
was to have a relationship  with a financial agency that was willing to lend and had access to cash
suppl:es.  Lending by banks has remained  conditione.1  on a net balance criterion  for fi. 3ncial viability;
receivables and liquidity have simply to  exceed debt 3.  Further, any firm's positive balance in
transactions with other firms has not been discounted  by probability of repayment.  This in itself
motivated  the accumulation  of arrears prior to the summer  of 1992  35.  Even so, it seems probable  that
32 We  assume  away  financial  reserves  as being  largely  wiped  out by inflation  and the  January  price  jump in
particular.
31They  include  social  insurance  and  pension  deductions,  income  tax  (basic  rate 12%;  maximum  rate  40%);  bank
commission  charges  (0.5-5%)  and  a higher  profit  tax  when  wages  exceeded  the  norm.
3'  This  ignores  obvious  other  channels  -- bank-firm  links,  preferential  treatment  and so on.
"  See Ickes  and Ryterman  (1992)  for a fuller  discussion.Fig  12
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the dominant  factor determining  credit flows  in the first half of 1992  were availability  of cash, given the
ruble shortage, and personal connections  between  firms and banks.  The first constraint  drops in the
second half of the year and the permissive  stance of the Central Bank after July further promoted  easy
credit lines.
Noting the presence of a strong bargaining role for insider workers in Russian firms and the
explicit distinction over cash and non-cash rubles giving rise to non-trivial  transaction  costs, we can
assume that the firm maximizes  the welfare of current members  subject  to a cash-in-advance  constraint.
Holding employment  constant,  we can write;
Ow,p,q,<h,  ; where h, = real monetary  balances;  p, = price of primary non-labour  input, c, =
quantity of primary input and w, = wages.
The problem for the firm is to secure  sufficient  cash income  to meet current wage claims  and cover  any
cash charges  for non-labour  inputs. We assume  that the firm  has no financial  reserves and hence  depends
exclusively  on liquidity to fmance  current activity.  Note that if non-cash ruble payments  continue in
effect as normal (through 'insured' arrears) and cover most of non-labour  production costs, then the
constraint effectively  becomes;
,Bw,<h,
We can now summarize  several  ways in which the ability of firms to satisfy current wage claims could
have been compromised.  But first, we should distinguish  over two categories of firms.  The first
comprises  producers, primarily  consumer  goods  producers,  who have  greater possibilities  for unmediated
access to cash income,  depending  on combinations  of government  purchases  and household  demand. The
second includes  intermediate  or capital  goods  producers  who  have  pr,marily  transacted  in non-cash  rubles,
save for explicit allocations  for paying wages.
The simplest  case would  arise where  wages  were  the sole item covered  by cash rubles. For group
one producers, dependent  largely  on household  demand,  the first half of 1992  contained  a major negative
demand  shock. Real monetary  balances  and wages  fell unambiguously  and by large apparent  magnitudes.
We observe a very sharp contraction  in retail sales and mav presume some accumulation  of finished
goods inventories. As government  spending  was  held relatively  in check over this period, we may alsc,
observe a contraction  in government  purchases  36,  For group two firms, the key issue would  have been
the ability to shift into cash sales, say, circuitously  by barter deals or by direct export contracts. Given
36 The  fiscal  deficit  was  roughly  3% and  5% of GDP  over first  and second  quarters  respectively.Wage and Emplovment  Decisions  -W
the fiictions associated with inter-republican  trade we can assume that this was not invariably  an easy
option, while domestic barter deals would ultimately  be subject to similar negative household  demand
effects.  The picture is obviously  complicated  once one introduces  quantity cs...traints on production -
as through the inavailability  of inputs -- or of restrictions on financing production through non-cash
rubles.
The observed relative restraint in wage growth over the first half of 1992  can be traced to firm
level difficulties  in realizing  cash income, holding  employment  constant. These difficulties  can be traced
to the technical  const;aint on ruble supply  and to downward  pressure on current revenue  streams arising
from a combination  of demand  and supply shocks. This view is supported by the firm level responses
in the World Bank survey.  When asked what were the main constraints  to wage increases  in 1991  and
1992, tax constraints  and sales revenues  both accounted  for 40% of responses  for 1991. By contrast, for
1992 the sales revenue constraint accounted for nearly 70% of responses  3.  The fmancial system
evidently  amplified  the negative  shocks  to household  demand. The constant  employment  rule results from
the control structure of firms. Once the distinction  over cash and non-cash  rubles was almost completely
collapsed in mid-1992  38  and the technical constraint on cash was broken in July/August, the firm's
decision  boiled down to choice over respective  allocations  to non-labour  charges, wages  and other costs.
It seems likely that insider bargaining  power could drive wages more rapidly in this context and we do
indeed observe more wage drift in the second  half of the year.  Likewise,  there is some evidence  - for
example in the World Bank firm sample - that non-taxed  allowances  for increasing  benefits payments
were widely used as a supplementary  procedure for increasing wages 39.  The underlying process -
given the perceived failure to enforce  a hard budget  constraint on firms over 1992  - thus combines  two
potentially disastrous attributes; employment  stability and high nominal wage claims.  While the latter
may in part be contained in the government  or administrative  sector, firm's autonomy  and atrophied
competition  may prove sufficient conditions  for generalized  wage push.
5.4: Structurai Shocks
Structural shocks can be measured  by dispersion in employment  growth rates.  For the period
37  This  matches  exactlv  with  firms'  responses  to a question  regarding  the  use  of benchmarks  in setting  wages.
Nearly  70% indicated  available  resources  or current  income  streams;  27%  made  explicit  assocation  to changes  in
consumer  prices.
18  Firms  have  shifted  wherever  possible  into  cash  transactions,  either  directly  or through  the banking  system.
39  Cash  rubles  up to 5000  rbls  per worker  could  be used  for material  assistance  or benefits  without  deductions.Wage and Emplovment  Decisions  49
January 1992/January  1991 we note a rather small dispersion  using All-Russia  data.  There is a sharp
increase in the standard  deviation  and coefficient  of variation  of changes  by branch with respect  to earlier
periods but little with regard to chmnges  across sectors. This is confirmed  by the World Bank and ILO
datasets which show that, with the exception  of food processing  and constr;ction, negative  employment
changes  have converged  across branches.
Relating employment changes to  a  crude competitiveness measure yields no predictable
association. Employment  changes  are uncorrelated  with short-run  shadow  profit rates (where capital  and
labour are priced at zero), so that using hiternational  prices as a crude measure of competitiveness  we
observe no apparent structural  change  consistent  with those implicit  prices  4.  Indeed,  the sector - food
processing -- which registers massively  negative  profits at shadow  prices experienced  the least decline
in employment. These results are to be largely expected  given closed economy  conditions.
A more obvious association  would be between output and employment  changes and domestic
relative prices.  Assuming  reasonably  strict proportionality  in movements  of quantitative  variables, a
simplistic  equilibrium  framework  would predict a positive association  between the former and relative
prices as indicative  of a shift in the demand  curve; a negative  association  a shift in the supply  curve. But
preliminary regressions relating output and employment  changes as also output and employment  to
relative prices  at branch and regional  level provide  rather ambiguous  results. The output  to employment
link is largely absent although  we find weak evidence  of correlation  in the changes  when using  regional
data.  More promising  is the association  of branch level output  changes  to relative  prices.  Relating  the
change in branch output  relative to industrial  sector output  with the change  in branch relative  prices, we
observe a clear and reasonably  robust association  in the changes  over the majority of branches. The
association  is weakest  for the energy, building  materials  and food branches  but particularly  tight for light
and machine-building  industry; those experiencing  the strongest relative decline in output and relative
prices.  This provides some limited  evidence  in favour of some structural  component  to the distribution
of output losses but,  equally, provides little evidence that this has translated systematically  into
employment  changes.  Once again, we find evidence  of major inertia in the system and considerable
rigidity with respect to employment  changes.
40  See Senik-Leygonie  and Hughes  (1992) for shadow  profit rate calculations. Their manipulations  yield a 0.4
ratio of world value-added  to world  price for all Russian  tradables  sectors. Only oil and gas is close to unity with
wide variation across  industrial  branches.Wae  and Em2loymnent  Deisions  50
6: Conclusion
1992 was certainly a turbulent year in Russian history.  Regime changes  were announced  and
selective  actions taken to validate  those announcements.  But the balance  sheet a year later remains quite
ambiguous. In the labour market it is true that open unemployment  has been allowed  to emerge. By the
end of the year, the total number  of jobseekers  likely  exceeded  one million  but this amounted  to no more
than 2% of the labour force.  By the same token, wage and employment decisions were widely
liberalized,  despite vestigial  controls  over maximum  wage increases. Some restraints  on labour mobility
were also removed. Changes in ownership  title and the parallel expansion  of a private sector - as yet
largely concentrated  in services - had important  implications  for the distribution  of employment  across
public and private branches. But the data on the latter  are limited  and mostly  unreliable. In cases where
title change  has been initiated, preliminary  evidence  suggests  little real change in behaviour  whether with
respect to wage, employment  or output decisions.
These changes are clearly substantive,  particularly given the initial conditions. They are also
important  for future expectations  with respect to entitlements  to employment  and income.  But, as this
paper has demonstrated, the changes remain restricted and the sources of these restrictions imply
potentially  very significant  costs for the economy  at large. In particular, the inability  to break the soft
budget constrainL  of state firms - or more realistically impose a systematic and understood set of
constraints on the financing demand of firms - and hence of claims on the budget and/or banking
system, combined with a continuing  ability of fin-ms  to exercise ma-ket power alongside  weak controls
on wage claims, provides an obvious under-pinning  to the stagflationary  outcome that we presently
observe.
The paper has demonsLrated  the presence of considerable  inertia with respect to employment.
Employment  transitions have been dominated  by continuing  high levels of quits at the base of the skill
structure.  Involuntary separations have been limited even in contexts where capacity utilization has
collapsed. Those involuntarily  separated have largely  been women and/or white collar workers. Firms
have commonly  provided  de facto unemployment  compensation  to workers  in the formn  of minimum  wage
payments  and little or no work requirement. There is evidence  of some increase in the rate and share
of laid-ofi workers  in inflows to unemployment  in the later part of 1992  but the overall impression  is that
firms have preferred to hoard labour in the light of the uncertainty  over policy and firm or l roduct-
specific  market prospects.
Wages  have been more volatile. The price shock of January 1992 clipped real statistical wagesWage and Employment  Decisions  51
back to mid-1991  levels but comparisons  are of course extremely  problematic  given shortages. What is
more open to interpretation  is the evident rebound  through the later parts of 1992. This arises through
several channels. First, the institutional-cum-mechanical  constraints  on liquidity  were resolved  in mid-
year.  Larger denomination  bills and an explicit relaxation  of any tight money  policy resulted  in a major
injection  of credit to firns and the economy  as a whole. Second,  the cap on wage  claimns  - the minimum
wage times four rule -- proved weak as firms either elected to pay additional  profit tax or wrote wage
claims into side-payments  and/or benefits  deals.  We can trace this behaviour  to a range of factors that
include  worker control  over decision-making,  a perceived  high probability  of continuing  bailouts and the
apparent neutrality  of current wage claims with respect  to privatisation  possibilities. At the same time,
the very sharp acceleration  in monthly  changes  to producer  prices for large producers  points to, at best,
a stable pricing rule facilitating  nominal  claims, at worst an increase in the mark-up  which consequent
validation  of increased  wage claims. Third, we begin  to observe some increased  differentiation  in wages
across skills and across region.  But again we find evidence  of considerable  inertia in the system
constraining  the size of relative departures  from the prior tariff wage structure.
The overall conclusion is that while wages initially bore almost all the adjustment  costs, we
observe far stronger signs of wage push over the second haif of 1992. Employment  adjustme.;  begin
to increase in the latter part of the year but from a still low base.  But it is also true that  job losses are
significantly  offset by hires and that much of the churning  occurting through  the labour  market appears
to be through voluntary  separations  and transitions  over jobs.  This may in part be linked  to the process
of wage differentiation  that has begun and to the relatively  buoyant  demand  for labour  posted by firms.
The latter phenomenon  can be traced not simply  to institutional  inertia  (posted vacancies  differ widely
from nominal  vacancies)  but to semi-binding  short run constraints  on production  exercised  by technology
and the associated level and structure of labour demand.  The combination  of the above factors has
actively promoted the emergence  of a price-wage  spiral.  The effective  reversal of earlier announced
reforms  -- particularly  with regard  to the monetary  stance - and by workers' evident  intention  of linking
wage clairs  to price changes  has been the primary fuel.  The spiral is not a function  of trade union
power in the conventional  sense - most unions remain weak and fragmented  - but it does reflect the
control structure and decision-making  rules characterizing  the bulk of Russian firms.  Lax monetary
policy  and decentralized  insider  power, giving  rise to relative  employment  stability  and real wage rigidity,
are powerful ingredients  for a hyper-inflation.Wage and Emplovment  Decisions  52
Appendix I
The Russian  Firm Post-1988:  A Framework
We first provide a short discussion  of the practical derivation  of wages adopted by the great
majority of Russian firms with the Enterprise Law of  1988 r J  then.  associate it with a  model of
bargaining  between  managers  and workers  in a firm where the incentive  structure is given from outside.
Two sources of financing  for wages existed; the wage fund and the bonus fund.  At this stage,
we exclude  non-monetary  benefits  channelled  through the social  development  fund.  Consider the wage
fund first.  This was given by a norm related  mechanically  to the firm's gross revenues  (R), so that;
W=  {R.  The firm's gross profit was derived net of non-labour  costs (MC), the wage fund (W) and
depreciation  (6K);
Pg  = R'-MC-W-6K
Gross profit was adjusted  downwards  by a normative  capital  fee (,BK),  a unit labour  tax (ceN)  and interest
payments  (r) to the banking  system;  this yielded accounting  profit;
P  =  P'-aN-OK-r
From accounting  profit, transfers were made to local and state budgets and to the originating  ministry
(T).  Residual  profit was defined as;
pr  =  P' -T
The bonus fund - as also the social development  fund (benefits)  and the production  development  fund -
- was then centred on residual profits, again according to pre-given  nor,ms.
The formula  for both wage  and bonus  funds  evidently  introduces  a direct link  to firn performance
and provides  a strong profit-sharing  component  to aggregate  wage determinatior,.  This is reminiscent  of
the labour managed firm where average earnings, y, comprise a notional wage per worker, w, and a
share of profit (residual profit, in this instance);
y  =  w +0P / L
While superficially  this suggests  that the basic maxiinand  of the labour  managed firm might apply to the
Russian firm pre-1992, given exogenously  set employment  it would not be appropriate  to view average
per caput earnings  as a choice variable.
An alternative  way of couching  the problem is as follows. The firm comprises  two sets of agents,
workers and managers.  It operates with an  exogenously  given incentive  structure imposed  from the
centre.  Similarly  employment  is exogenously  given (n).  Prices are normalized  to one.  The workersWage and Emplovment  Decisions
utility function is additive  and is a negative  function of effort (E);
U,  =  u(E) + v(W),  where u'(E) < 0,  u"(E) <  O; v'(W) > 0, v"(W) <  O
The firm's production  function  can be written as;
G =  Ef(n), [f(n)  > 0, f'(n) > 0, f-(n) <  0]
where output is a function of the labour input, f(n), times the effort (E) given by the workers.
The Manager's utility is a function  of the pay he receives  (P tm) with that pay being a fraction (a2)
of the firm's profit (PEf(n) - Wn) and a fraction (as) of the value of output  (PEf(n)).
Pm =  a 2(PEf(n)-Wn)  +  aC 3PEf(n)
Simplifying;
pm  =  oi,PEf(n) - a2Wn, where a,  =a 2 +  CY3
The Manager's utility can be written as;
Ur  =  oi1PEf(n)  - a2Wn
so the manager's pay is positively related to the value of output and negatively  to the total wage bill.
This latter feature reflects the fact that the central authority gives priority to output and elimination of
excess demand  and uses  the parameters  a, and a 2 to achieve  those objectives. The central  agency's utility
function reads;
Ua =  -01,[rD] 2
- /3-1Y-Y-1 2
where  Y=output,  Y-=planned  output  and  ED  (excess  demand)=  PI  - (I-ce,)PEf(n)  +  (I-a 2)Wn,
(PI = investment).  Departures  from  optimal  values  of  output  decrease  utility  quadratically.  The
iistruments used wu  target zero excess demand and convergence  to planned output are the incentive
parameters (a,  and ae 2) conditioned on the manager's  pay.
Wages and effort are the outcome of a bargain between workers and managers.  The Nash
solution  is;
Max,z  {[a,PEf(n) - oe 2Wn - UM]O  [u(E)+v(W)  - U,J'0}
where 0 is the bargaining power parameter. In a cooperative  setting, it can be shown not only that the
central agency has a high degree of autonomy in achieving  its objectives  but that increasing  the output
incentive  (ai,) will imply higher wages paid to workers to motivate ; that an increase in ca 2 -- the wage
bill tax or penalty the central agency can impose if too-high  wages are granted -- will lower wages ".
'4 The  multipliers  for a change  in the Nash  bargaining  wage  (w) as a function of changes in the exogenous
variables  are;
W  =  fn(a,,  oY,,  P, n,  U,,,, U.)Waee and Emplovment  Decisions  54
Note that this holds for given employment. However, allowing  some measure of natural wastage, the
obvious  intuition  would be that a wage bill tax would  motivate  labour  shedding;  a process which is clearly
identifiable  in the second half of the 1980s  (see Section  2).  Further, an increase in the Worker's threat
point will raise wages and vice versa in the case of the Manager's threat point increasing.
The setting  above  assumes  a closed  economy  and fixed  prices. The framework  is cooperative  and
allows  the  external  agent  --  the  central  authority  -- to  achieve its  goals by  use  of  the  two  linearly
independent  instruments  cxl  and Ci2* It captures the broad features of a system in which the incentive
structure is determined  effectively outside the firm and in broad line with centrally  set objectives.  As
such it represents  more an idealized  model for the firm under central  planning. But it readily allows for
extension  to a less cooperative  setting in which, for example,  Workers and Managers  cooperate  with each
other against the central authority and where the latter's output and/or excess demand goals can be
violated  by the formers' behaviour.
Finally, the maximand  above has been written in terms  of wages  and/or effort with employment
exogenously given.  While this remains  -- as we show in Section 2 -- a reasonably apt characterisation
of the Russian environrment  until the present, there are at least signs that employment  should now be
modelled  as an endogenous  variable and hence figure directly  in the utility function.Wage and Employment  Decisions  55
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